Summary
In March 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA, among other things, requires states to expand Medicaid eligibility or lose Medicaid funding. Following the enactment of the ACA, state attorneys general and others brought several lawsuits challenging various provisions of the act on constitutional grounds. In National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court, among other things, decided that the enforcement mechanism for the ACA Medicaid expansion, withdrawal of all Medicaid funds, was a violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Court went on to hold, however, that the remedy was to sever that enforcement mechanism, effectively making state participation in the Medicaid expansion voluntary.
For instance, if a grant condition is directly related to the expenditure of federal funds in a state program or activity, then, according to Justice Robert?s opinion in
NFIB, the condition is usually constitutional under the Spending Clause. Or even if a grant condition is only generally related to the policy goals of the underlying grant, NFIB suggests that withdrawal of all program funds would still, in most foreseeable cases, be constitutional under the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment. If a grant condition is unrelated to the general policy goals of the underlying grant, however, then it is most likely unconstitutional under the Spending Clause. This latter standard, however, has been in place since the
Dole case, and no court has ever struck down a federal law on this basis.
Justice Roberts? concern in NFIB arguably dealt with a different question: whether a grant condition attached to a new and independent program (here, the Medicaid expansion) which threatens the funding of an existing program (here Medicaid) is constitutional. In such cases, if the withholding of federal funding represents a significant portion of a state?s budget, and there are distinguishing factors among the programs, then that condition may be unconstitutionally coercive under the Tenth Amendment. Justice Roberts did not identify a standard to determine what level of withholding funds would be coercive, or specify what kind of distinguishing factors were necessary. He did conclude, however, that withdrawal of federal program funds which made up ten percent of an average state?s budget represented a ?gun to the head? and was a form of ?economic dragooning.?
How courts are to consider grant withdrawals below ten percent, however, is not addressed by the Roberts? opinion, and Justice Roberts declined to speculate where such a line would be drawn. It should be noted, however, that few federal programs even approach the level of Medicaid funds provided to the states. Thus, if the ten percent threshold and the need for distinguishing factors mark the outer limits of Congress?s power, then the case may have minimal effect on existing or future federal grant conditions.
